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ABSTRACT
Objectives: In 2002, the Pharmaceutical Management
Agency (PHARMAC) began negotiating new price contracts
for 90% of hospital pharmaceuticals on behalf of all New
Zealand (NZ) public hospitals (“price management” [PM]).
The present study was undertaken to examine the impact
of 3 years of PM on hospital pharmaceutical expenditure,
and the impact of the new contracts on the availability of
medicines.
Methods: Annual savings for 29 major public hospitals
(ﬁnancial years 2003/4 to 2005/6) were calculated from the
data from 11 hospitals and data from PHARMAC. Inpatient
and total hospital pharmaceutical expenditure (IPE, THPE)
(2000/1 to 2005/6) were calculated from the data from 23
hospitals. Hospital pharmaceutical expenditure (2000/1 to
2005/6) was compared with community pharmaceutical
expenditure (CPE) in NZ, and with THPE in the UK,
Canada, Norway, and Sweden. Surveys were undertaken
(2004, 2005) to examine any changes in medicine availability
resulting from the new contracts.
Results: Annual savings were NZ$7.84 million (m) to
NZ$13.45m (2003/4 to 2005/6). Growth in IPE slowed for
all hospitals in 2003 to 2004. Mean growth was higher for
IPE and THPE than for CPE (8.8%, 9.7% vs. 1.9%). Mean
growth in THPE appeared slightly lower in NZ (9.6%) and
Norway (7.3%) than in the UK 14%, Sweden 12.5%, or
Canada 10.2%. Some availability problems occurred with
new contract items (“out-of-stocks”; products perceived as
inferior). Problems were usually resolved in weeks, but some
took more than a year.
Conclusion: PM was moderately successful saving NZ$8m
to NZ$13m (6–8%) in 2003/4 to 2005/6 and slowing growth
in IPE in 2003/4. Further research should examine whether
the favorable economic effects can be sustained while unfa-
vorable effects are minimized.
Keywords: budget impact analysis, cost, economics, hospital,
pharmaceuticals.
Introduction
Pharmaceutical expenditure in primary care and hos-
pitals has risen steadily as a share of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in recent years, averaging 15% of
annual health-care expenditure in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development countries
(1970–1996) [1]. Drivers of growth are considered to
be an increase in the average price of medicines (as new
medicines are substituted for older cheaper medicines,
and new medicines become available to treat previ-
ously untreatable disease) and an increase in the utili-
zation of medicines (as populations increase in age and
size) [2–4]. Countries and organizations have used
“supply-side” and “demand-side” measures to curb
this growth [5,6]. Supply-side measures focus on nego-
tiations with vendors, e.g., price and/or proﬁt control,
pooled procurement, rebates, reference pricing, expen-
diture ceilings, and positive or negative lists. Demand-
side measures focus on decreasing or managing the
utilization of pharmaceuticals by prescribers and
patients, e.g., educational campaigns, prescribing
guidelines, patient copayments, and switching pre-
scription medicines to over-the-counter availability.
Growth in pharmaceutical expenditure in hospitals
has been a particular concern in recent years as many
new expensive medicines are initiated in this setting
[7]. In 2002 to 2003, publicly funded hospital phar-
maceutical expenditure comprised 20% to 26% of
the total pharmaceutical expenditure in New Zealand
(NZ), the UK, Australia, and the United States [8–11].
Hospital pharmaceutical procurement systems vary
from country to country with mainly local procure-
ment by individual hospitals in the UK, Sweden, and
Australia but with a proportion of medicines (mainly
generics) procured nationally, regionally, or statewide
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[12–14]. In Canada, hospitals use group procurement
for pharmaceuticals [15]. Both local and group pro-
curement occur in hospitals in the United States [16].
Norway has had a national scheme for the procure-
ment of hospital pharmaceuticals since 1995 [17].
Before 2002, pharmaceutical procurement in NZ was
undertaken by individual hospitals, apart from a short
period of group purchasing in the 1980s [18].
Since 1993, PHARMAC, the government’s Phar-
maceutical Management Agency, has successfully
managed pharmaceutical expenditure in primary care
mainly through supply-side measures [19,20]. In 2001,
the government authorized PHARMAC to manage the
pharmaceutical expenditure in public hospitals, and
in 2002, they launched a three-part National Hospital
Pharmaceutical Strategy for this purpose. PHAR-
MAC’s main initiatives were to 1) negotiate new
national, as opposed to current local contracts for
around 90% of hospital pharmaceuticals (price man-
agement [PM]); 2) provide economic assessments of
new hospital medicines (assessment of new medicines
[ANM]); and 3) coordinate activities for improving the
use of medicines in hospitals (quality use of medicines
[QUM]) [21]. Pharmacists and other health profes-
sionals were concerned about the possible impact of
these initiatives, and the impact of the strategy’s new
contracts on the availability of medicines [21]. Earlier
studies examined the impact of PM (ﬁrst year only),
and the ANM and QUM initiatives [22–25]. The aim
of the present study was to examine the impact of
3 years of PM on hospital pharmaceutical expenditure,
and the impact of new contracts on the availability of
medicines.
Methods
Data were sought from chief pharmacists at all hospi-
tals employing a pharmacist in NZ, the major public
hospitals, 30 hospitals in 2002, and 29 hospitals there-
after. The hospitals were classiﬁed into three types for
analysis, with assistance from the Ministry of Health.
Tertiary hospitals were those with all specialties on-site
including a renal unit. Secondary hospitals were those
with most specialties on-site but with some visiting
specialists. Rural/special hospitals were small hospitals
with only visiting specialists or hospitals for a special
group of patients (e.g., psychiatric). Three investiga-
tions were developed for the present study: two to
examine the economic impact of PM, and one to inves-
tigate the effects of the new contracts on the availabil-
ity of those medicines.
Top 150 Analysis
The aim of this investigation was to determine the
impact of price changes resulting from PHARMAC’s
strategy from 3 years of PM. The Top 150 method was
initially discussed and the ﬁrst year results were
reported in an earlier article [23].
The Top 150 method involved the chief pharmacists
at 11 NZ hospitals calculating a projected saving (or
cost) for their Top 150 items of pharmaceutical expen-
diture for year two (ﬁnancial year 2003/4), three, and
four from price changes, and volumes used in year one
(2002/3), two, and three. Exact calculations were not
possible because prestrategy prices between the suppli-
ers of pharmaceuticals and the hospitals were conﬁden-
tial. Therefore, 13 hospitals, representing the three
types of hospitals and different geographic localities,
were approached, and 11 hospitals provided the data.
Projections were for 2003/4 to 2005/6 (July 1–June 30).
Net adjustments were added, calculated from the
ﬁgures obtained from PHARMAC, i.e., additional
savings from any rebates, bonuses, and discounts on
invoices, minus the cost of compensation payments.
PHARMAC estimated the compensation payments
from the wholesalers’ and suppliers’ information.
(Compensation payments were amounts paid by a hos-
pital to a pharmaceutical supplier of an item on a new
contract, for purchasing a noncontract brand in excess
of agreed limits, i.e., discretionary variance (DV) limits.
Limits were usually 0% to 5% of the total expenditure
on that item). Compensation payments were $5000 per
breach in 2003/4 to 2004/5, and NZ$1000 per breach
in 2005/6. An assumption was made that projected
savings from price changes in year one would continue
similarly in subsequent years. Projected savings and net
adjustments were used to estimate the annual savings
for 2003/4 to 2005/6 using the formulae in Table 1.
Some accuracy checks were made. Chief pharma-
cists were asked to recalculate the savings 1) for items
where new contract prices (not conﬁdential) were
incorrectly listed and 2) for items with “outlier results”
(showing substantial savings or costs compared with
other hospitals). Items with new contracts were called
“section H items” because they are listed in section H
of NZ’s pharmaceutical schedule.
Median savings per hospital bed (or per bed-day)
were used to calculate the projected savings for 29
hospitals from the projected savings for 11 hospitals
(data were not normally distributed). The chief phar-
macists provided information on bed numbers, and the
Ministry of Health on bed-days [26]. Median savings
per bed (or bed-day) for each type of hospital were
multiplied by the number of missing beds (or bed-days)
and added to known values to give an estimate of the
projected savings for 29 hospitals. (Missing beds/bed-
days were the total number of beds/bed-days from the
18 hospitals that were not providing data). A sensitivity
analysis was undertaken. The lowest and highest
savings per bed (or bed-day) for each type of hospital
were multiplied by the missing beds (or bed-days) and
added to known values to give an upper and lower limit
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of a range for each type of hospital. Projected savings
and a rangewere calculated for the 29 hospitals in total.
(Note that this methodology differs slightly from that
used in the earlier article [23]. Medians, highest and
lowest savings per bed/bed-days, were applied only to
missing bed/bed-days in the present study, but to all
bed/bed-days in the earlier article). Items with new
contract prices were identiﬁed from current section H
lists, categorized using the World Health Organiza-
tion’s anatomical therapeutic chemical (ATC) classiﬁ-
cation system, ranked in order of projected savings, and
tabulated by hospital type [27].
Hospital Pharmaceutical Expenditure (HPE) Analysis
The aim of this investigation was to determine whether
the PM part of the strategy would impact on growth
in hospital pharmaceutical expenditure (inpatient
and/or total). Because national hospital pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure ﬁgures were not routinely collected by
the Ministry of Health, ﬁgures were sought directly
from the hospitals. (Only two ofﬁcial estimates have
been recently published: NZ$140m in 2003 [8] and
NZ$174m in 2007 [28]).
Chief pharmacists at all 29 hospitals were asked
to provide data on total hospital pharmaceutical
expenditure (THPE) and inpatient pharmaceutical
expenditure (IPE) for the ﬁnancial years: 2000/1 to
2005/6 (July 1–June 30). IPE was calculated from
THPE by subtracting the sum of expenditure on out-
patient prescriptions and expenditure on pharmaceu-
ticals supplied to other hospitals/institutions. The
terms total hospital pharmaceutical expenditure 29
(THPE29) and inpatient pharmaceutical expenditure
29 (IPE29) were used to denote pharmaceutical expen-
diture for all 29 hospitals. One rural/special hospital
had missing data for 2005/6 through contracting out a
small part of their dispensing to three community
pharmacies. Missing data were calculated by costing
the medicines supplied, and the original ﬁgure was
updated. A subset of hospitals provided a full 6-year
data set. Data were found to be normally distributed,
so mean expenditure per bed-day (and conﬁdence
limits) were calculated for each type of hospital and
each year. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was
undertaken on bed-day data.
IPE29 and THPE29 were calculated for all 29 hos-
pitals from the data from the subset of hospitals that
were able to provide data each year. Mean expenditure
per bed-day was multiplied by the number of missing
bed-days for each type of hospital, and added to known
data. (Missing bed-days were the total number of bed-
days from the hospitals that did not provide data in a
particular year). A sensitivity analysis was undertaken
by multiplying the missing bed-days for each type of
hospital, by the upper and lower conﬁdence intervals
around the mean. These were added to the known
values to calculate the upper and lower limits of the
range. A range was not calculated if a data set for a
hospital type was complete for that ﬁnancial year.
Tables and graphs of IPE were prepared and examined
for trends. An assumption was made that IPE trends in
the 11 hospitals would reﬂect trends in all 29 hospitals,
so a post hoc analysis of data from the Top 150 analysis
(11 hospitals) for 2002/3 to 2004/5 was undertaken to
identify any reasons for the trends.
IPE29 and THPE29, representing expenditure in
the major hospitals, were considered a proxy measure
for IPE and THPE for all NZ public hospitals. Com-
munity pharmaceutical expenditure (CPE) ﬁgures for
NZ were obtained for the years 2000/1 to 2005/6
from the ofﬁcial statistics [29]. CPE, IPE29, and
THPE29 growth were compared. In addition, an
Internet search was undertaken for the ofﬁcial statis-
tics (in the English language) on hospital pharmaceu-
tical expenditure from developed countries. THPE29
was compared with the data obtained. Explanations
for trends were sought from pharmaceutical experts
and the literature.
Table 1 Projected savings, net adjustments, and annual savings
July 1, 2003–June 30, 2004
(NZ$)
July 1, 2004–June 30, 2005
(NZ$)
July 1, 2005–June 30, 2006
(NZ$)
Projected savings (PS)* 5,456,045 2,299,070 2,268,663
(4,728,978–6,481,507) (2,121,159–2,607,636) (1,795,943–2,620,405)
= PS1 = PS2 = PS3
Rebates (R)† 1,060,900 1,402,225 1,688,600
Bonuses and discount oninvoices (B)† 1,457,654 2,129,341 1,738,453
Compensation payments (C)† 130,500 75,000 5,000
(58,000–203,000) (289,500–98,000) (0–6,000)
Net adjustments (NA) = R + B - C 2,388,054 3,456,566 3,422,053
(2,315,554–2,460,554) (3,433,566–3,503,566) (3,421,053–3,427,053)
=NA1 =NA2 =NA3
Estimated annual savings* 7,844,099 11,211,681 13,445,831
(7,044,532–8,942,061) (10,283,703–12,592,709) (12,067,133–15,136,601)
= PS1 +NA1 = PS1 + PS2 +NA2 = PS1 + PS2 + PS3 +NA3
*By savings per bed-day.
†Figures from the Pharmaceutical Management Agency.
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Availability of Medicines Surveys
The aim of this investigation was to determine the
impact of the new contracts under the PM part of the
strategy on the availability of medicines. A survey was
administered to chief pharmacists at all 29 hospitals in
July 2004 and repeated in July 2005. The respondents
were asked 1) for examples of where section H con-
tracts had resulted in the loss of access to useful phar-
maceutical items; 2) how hospitals had overcome the
loss of these items; 3) for examples of section H items
considered by hospitals as inferior to items they were
replacing; and 4) for examples of useful new pharma-
ceutical items becoming available as a result of the new
section H contracts. Results, and any unsolicited com-
ments, were examined.
Results
Top 150 Analysis
Eleven of the 13 hospitals originally approached pro-
vided data, i.e., ﬁve tertiary, three secondary, and three
rural/special hospitals. Two hospitals were unable to
participate because of time/data retrieval constraints.
The annual savings were calculated from the projected
savings and net adjustments as described earlier.
Projected savings for the 11 hospitals were
NZ$3,439,749 (2003/4), $1,464,182 (2004/5), and
$1,349,342 (2005/6). Savings were projected for all
types of hospital, and as a proportion of expenditure,
were higher for rural/special (R/S) and secondary (S)
than tertiary (T) hospitals each year: T5.3%, S7.4%,
R/S9.6% (2003/4); T2.5%, S2.7%, R/S4.5% (2004/5);
and T1.9%, S2.4%, R/S2.3% (2005/6).
The main drivers of the projected savings on section
H items by the ATC category varied. In 2003/4, they
were agents for infections (antibiotics) (55% of
savings); the nervous system (anesthetics, antipsychot-
ics) (29%); musculoskeletal system (bisphosphonates)
(6%); and blood/blood-forming organs (plasma sub-
stitutes) (5%). In 2004/5, they were agents for infec-
tions (antivirals, antibiotics) (50%); the nervous
system (analgesics) (20%); alimentary tract (proton
pump inhibitors) (10%). In 2005/6, they were agents
for the alimentary tract (5HT3-antagonists) (45%);
antineoplastic/immunomodulating agents (taxanes)
(28%); and infections (antibiotics) (17%).
Using savings per bed-day, projected savings (range)
for 29 hospitals were estimated to be NZ$5,456,045
(4,728,978–6,481,507) in 2003/4; $2,299,070
(2,121,159–2,607,636) in 2004/5; and $2,268,663
(1,795,943–2,620,405) in 2005/6 (Table 1). Estimates
were very similar whether calculated using savings per
bed or per bed-day, but the latter were considered more
accurate, reﬂecting activity rather than capacity.
Net adjustments were calculated as NZ$2,388,054
(2,315,554–2,460,554) for 2003/4 (NA1); $3,456,566
(3,433,566–3,503,566) for 2004/5 (NA2); and
$3,422,053 (3,421,053–3,427,053) for 2005/6 (NA3)
(Table 1). Rebates, bonuses, and discount on invoices
increased froma total ofNZ$1,438,609 in 2002/3 (part
year) to $3,427,053 by 2005/6. Compensation pay-
ments decreased from NZ$130,500 in 2003/4 to
NZ$5,000 by 2005/6.
Annual savings for 29 hospitals, by savings per
bed-day, were estimated asNZ$7,844,099 (7,044,532–
8,942,061) for 2003/4; $11,211,681 (10,283,703–
12,592,709) for 2004/5; and $13,445,831
(12,067,133–15,136,601) for 2005/6 (Table 1).
Hospital Pharmaceutical Expenditure Analysis
Twenty-three (79%) of the 29 hospitals contacted
(representing 87% of the total bed-days) provided
hospital pharmaceutical expenditure data for 2000/1
to 2005/6: 5 tertiary, 11 secondary, and 7 rural/special
hospitals. Five hospitals provided the data for part of
the period and one was unable to provide the data
because of time/technology constraints. IPE29 and
THPE29 were calculated from IPE23 and THPE23 as
outlined earlier. The ANOVA test detected no signiﬁ-
cant change in bed-days during the period 2000/1 to
2005/6 (around 2.5 m per year for all 29 hospitals).
Figure 1 shows the effect of PM on IPE29 and THPE29
from 2000/1 to 2005/6.
IPE29 increased from approximately NZ$98m in
2000/1, to almost NZ$150m in 2005/6 (Table 2,
Fig. 2): from NZ$59 to NZ$97m for all six tertiary
hospitals; NZ$31 to NZ$44m for all 12 secondary
hospitals; and from NZ$8.6 to NZ$9.4m for all 11
rural/special hospitals. Growth in IPE29 slowed in
2003/4 for all types of hospitals. A sensitivity analysis
indicated a range of up to 7% around the point
estimates (Table 1).
THPE29 increased from approximately NZ$110m
in 2000/1, to almost NZ$174m in 2005/6 (Table 3,
Fig. 3): from NZ$63 to NZ$108m for all six tertiary
hospitals; from NZ$37 to NZ$52m for all 12 second-
ary hospitals; and from NZ$10 to NZ$13m for all 11
rural/special hospitals. THPE29 growth appeared
higher for all hospitals in total in 2004/5 to 2005/6,
but appeared to slow for rural/special hospitals in
2002/3 and 2005/6, and for secondary hospitals in
2003/4 and 2005/6. A sensitivity analysis indicated a
range of up to 6% around the point estimates
(Table 2).
The post hoc analysis identiﬁed the likely major
contributors to the NZ$20m increases in IPE29 in
2002/3 to 2004/5 (Table 2). Expenditure increased by
almost NZ$9m for antineoplastic/immunomodu-
lating agents; by NZ$2.4m for agents for the nervous
system; and by $NZ1.2m for agents for blood/blood-
forming organs.
There appeared to be a higher mean growth rate per
annum for hospital pharmaceutical expenditure in NZ,
IPE29 (8.8%) and THPE29 (9.7%), than for CPE
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(1.9%) (Table 4, Fig. 4). Growth was lower for CPE for
all years except 2003/4. In 2003/4, the growth rate for
IPE29 was marginally lower (5% for CPE vs. 3.9% for
IPE29). THPE was identiﬁed for Canada (2001–2003),
the UK and Norway (2001–2004), and Sweden (2001–
2005) (Table 5). With the exception of Norway in 2002
(-1.4%), THPE increased yearly for each country. Nor-
wegian contacts could provide no speciﬁc reason for
this decrease [30].Mean growth in THPE inNZ (9.6%)
and Norway (7.3%) appeared slightly lower than in the
other countries (UK 14%; Sweden 12.5%; andCanada,
three published ﬁgures, 10.2%) (Table 5, Fig. 5). Statis-
tical analysis was considered inappropriate because this
aggregate data may not compare identical cohorts each
year.
Availability of Medicines Surveys
Twenty-eight hospitals (97%) responded in 2004, and
25 (86%) in 2005. Results indicated that the contracts
had both favorable and unfavorable effects on the
availability of medicines.
Respondents commented on the favorable aspects
of the new contracts: reduced prices for previously
expensive medicines; the availability of some new
injections that were previously difﬁcult to source; and
some new items for primary care becoming available in
hospitals at the same advantageous prices. Neverthe-
less, some respondents from secondary hospitals in
smaller towns cited the difﬁculty of obtaining thehos-
pital brand when their wholesaler tended to stock the
community brand.
Unfavorable effects were discrepancies in brand
availability between hospital and community; a per-
ceived loss of access to some medicines (lack of choice
of products, pack sizes, and some temporary short-
ages); and some products perceived as “inferior.” Some
brand discrepancies required an explanation to
patients (where hospital brands differed from those
funded for primary care, e.g., glyceryl trinitrate sprays
and salbutamol inhalers). Loss of access and choice
was perceived because purchasing an alternative to the
section H brand could result in being charged a com-
pensation payment. Examples cited were a lack of a
pleasant tasting, color-free version of paracetamol
liquid; a lack of hydrocortisone cream packs greater
than 15 g; and a lack of small packs of some tablets.
Respondents reported some temporary shortages
of section H brands of injections and tablets.
Access problems appeared to be resolved in weeks,
overall, but some problems took more than a year.
0
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40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
120,000,000
140,000,000
160,000,000
180,000,000
200,000,000
2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6
NZ$
THPE without PHARMAC intervention 
THPE with PHARMAC intervention 
IPE without PHARMAC intervention 
IPE with PHARMAC intervention 
(PHARMAC, Pharmaceutical Management Agency) 
Figure 1 Impact of price management on in-
patient pharmaceutical expenditure (IPE29) and
total hospital pharmaceutical expenditure
(THPE29).
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Respondents overcame “loss of access” by using an
alternative (sometimes more expensive) medical entity
or another brand but keeping expenditure within the
DV limits; repackaging items to overcome large pack
sizes; and using short-dated tablets brieﬂy after their
expiry in emergency situations. The respondents were
unsure whether “out-of-stocks” resulted from PHAR-
MAC’s sole-supply contracts, or from issues related to
international markets. Some thought the strategy had
led to an increased numbers of medicines only avail-
able as unlicensed medicines, and to increased sourcing
of medicines from overseas. Others thought this trend
began before the strategy.
Nevertheless, some of the perceived “loss of access”
attributed to the strategy resulted from other
PHARMAC activities such as community pharmacy
contracts, e.g., the uncoated paracetamol tablets that
some patients found difﬁcult to swallow. Because of a
“sole-supply” contract for community pharmaceuti-
cals, uncoated tablets became the only reasonably
priced source for hospitals in 2003. Coated tablets, no
longer subsidized for community prescribing, resumed
a list price twice than previously charged. The issue
was resolved in 2005 when a community contract was
agreed for both brands at similar low prices.
Some products were perceived as inferior, e.g., three
hospitals considered “look-alike” ampoules of an
antiemetic and a muscle relaxant (both kept close to
patients in theaters) inferior and a potential hazard.
One hospital used an alternative antiemetic for safety
reasons, incurring considerable extra costs. Eleven
respondents considered the new long-acting morphine
tablets inferior to the previous brand, saying patients
reported reduced pain relief, and that therewas a lack of
information on the possible rectal use of the tablets.
Eight respondents thought the section H paracetamol
liquid an inferior product and four, that children dis-
liked the taste. These last two issues were reported to be
resolved later when the DV limits were removed and
other brands could be purchased without penalty. Four
hospitals reported dissatisfaction with the hospital
brand of glyceryl trinitrate spray, citing: a stronger mist
when administering it; difﬁcult for arthritic patients to
use; difﬁcult to see when the spray was empty; and no
placebo was available to demonstrate to new users.
Some unsolicited comments were made: “in general
things haven’t really changed for us for better or worse”
(tertiary hospital); “overall, I think the concept is good
but the administration of it is a nightmare, e.g., to make
sure we don’t accidentally buy the wrong brand!”
(secondary hospital); and “we had good access (to
pharmaceuticals) before, but now we do have price
advantages” (secondary hospital). One respondent
emphasized the difﬁculties for smaller hospitals if the
supplier had “draconian terms of trade” like large
minimum orders or limits on the numbers of orders per
month (rural/special hospital). Another summarizedTa
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“overall, I don’t feel that sectionHhas been particularly
helpful or unhelpful. It does limit choices and means
you have to be very alert to ensure you purchase the
contracted brands or risk the dreaded ﬁne; as often
there is only one brand to choose from, I do not see that
PHARMAC can really dictate prices to any great extent
on the more expensive items” (rural/special hospital).
Discussion
In 2002, PHARMAC launched the National Hospital
Pharmaceutical Strategy to manage hospital pharma-
ceutical expenditure in NZ. The present study exam-
ined the impact of 3 years of PM, one part of the
strategy, on hospital pharmaceutical expenditure, and
the impact of the new contracts on the availability of
medicines. The study found that PM was moderately
successful. Savings of NZ$8m to NZ$13m (6–8%) per
annum were made (2003/4 to 2005/6), and growth in
IPE appeared to slow down for all types of hospitals in
the year after the launch of the strategy (2003/4).
Growth in hospital pharmaceutical expenditure in NZ
appeared higher than growth in CPE, and mean
growth in hospital pharmaceutical expenditure in NZ
(and Norway) appeared slightly lower than in the UK
and Sweden. Some availability problems occurred with
items on new contracts such as “out-of-stocks” or
products considered inferior by respondents. These
problems were usually resolved in weeks, but some
took more than a year.
The Top 150 analysis estimated an annual savings of
NZ$7.84m to NZ$13.45m per annum for the years
ending June 30, 2004 to June 30, 2006, 6% to 8%of the
estimated hospital pharmaceutical expenditure. The
annual savings were derived from the projected savings
and net adjustments. As expected moderate savings,
rather than increased costs, were projected on the Top
150 items of pharmaceutical expenditure compared
with pre-strategy years for all types of hospitals each
year. Projected savings were greater in the ﬁrst year of
the strategy (around NZ$5.5m) than in subsequent
years (around NZ$2m), and greater as a proportion of
expenditure for the smaller hospitals. The latter was
expected because smaller hospitals probably had less
attractive contracts in place before the strategy (possi-
bly because lower volumes of use resulted in weaker
bargaining power). Net adjustments were calculated
(rebates, bonuses, and discounts on invoices less com-
pensation payments) and represented modest addi-
tional savings each year, for example NZ$3,422,053 in
2005/6. In 2003/4, the net adjustments were lower than
the projected savings in monetary terms, but were
higher in subsequent years. Compensation payments
were small in comparison with other adjustments and
decreased each year possibly because compliance with
contracts improved as hospitals became increasingly
motivated to avoid these payments.
Savings appear to have been achieved by targeting
contracts to high-volume pharmaceuticals. Savings
were predominantly from antibiotics, anesthetics,
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6
All hospitals 
Tertiary hospitals 
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Rural/special hospitals 
Figure 2 Percentage growth in inpatient phar-
maceutical expenditure, 29 hospitals (IPE29).
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antipsychotics, bisphosphonates, and blood substitutes
(ﬁrst year); antivirals, analgesics, and gastrointestinal
agents (second year); and antibiotics, antipsychotics,
antiemetics, and cytotoxics (third year). Because
generic versions of some hospital medicines began to
be marketed during this period, some savings might
have occurred regardless of the strategy. Nevertheless,
the impact of this was considered to be small because
hospitals using some generic versions of antibiotics
and bisphosphonates before the strategy still indicated
substantial savings on these particular items. It is likely
that PHARMAC was able to negotiate lower prices for
new generics than prices previously available to the
hospitals.
As anticipated, the present study indicated some
slowing in growth in hospital pharmaceutical expendi-
ture during the period. In 2003 to 2004, the year after
the launch of the strategy IPE slowed for all types of
hospitals. Furthermore, there were decreases in IPE for
the smaller hospitals (rural/special) in 2002 to 2003 and
2003/4 and in THPE in 2002/3. This larger impact on
the smaller hospitals was anticipated as discussed
earlier. The study indicated that, with the exception of
IPE29 in 2003/4, hospital pharmaceutical expenditure
grew faster than CPE. The post hoc analysis suggested
growth in hospital pharmaceutical expenditure was
mainly due to expenditure growth on antineoplastic/
immunomodulating agents. Some growth was ex-
pected, because a list of anticancer treatments, to which
hospitalswere expected to provide access, was agreed in
2002. (A “Pharmaceutical Cancer Treatment Scheme”
was launched in 2002, an initiative to improve equity of
access to cancer treatments in NZ, but not part of the
National Hospital Pharmaceutical Strategy). Before
2002, hospitals used a locally agreed range of antican-
cer treatments, and anecdotal reports suggest some
hospitals rarely used the newer more expensive treat-
ments. From 2002, these hospitals were obliged to
provide the more expensive anticancer treatments for
certain cancers, and this may have contributed to some
degree to the growth in hospital pharmaceutical expen-
diture. Growth also occurred with other newer phar-
maceuticals, but would likely have been greater had PM
not been in place, because many of these had price
reductions under this scheme. Increased use of new,
expensive pharmaceuticals is a well-known driver of
expenditure growth. PHARMAC, aware of this, has
some initiatives in place to moderate this. These were
discussed in earlier articles [22,25]. THPE appeared to
grow more slowly in NZ and Norway than the UK,
Sweden, in the period (Canada had only three values to
compare). National pooled procurement for hospital
medicines in both countries may have contributed to
this [21,30]. Nevertheless, caution must be exercised in
comparing the countries’ aggregate data because differ-
ences in health systems and other confounding factors
exist.Ta
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The availability of medicines surveys found some
modest availability effects resulting from the new con-
tracts. Favorable effects were the reduced cost of
some medicines and access to some new medicines.
Unfavorable effects were brand choice restrictions,
out-of-stock and short-dated items, and products per-
ceived as inferior. Problems were mainly resolved in
weeks or months, but some took more than a year.
Unfavorable effects have occurred with other pooled
procurement schemes, and frustration (from choice
restrictions) has led to decreased contract compliance
over time [18,31]. In contrast, the present study
showed increased compliance over time, similar to
that achieved by group purchasing organizations in the
United States (hospitals agree to a high level of com-
pliance but are allowed to purchase a small percentage
of noncontract items) [32]. The threat of compensa-
tion payments under the strategy appears to have
motivated staff in NZ hospitals to comply with
the contracts. Nevertheless, quicker responses on
“inferior” products would increase conﬁdence in
PHARMAC’s abilities to manage hospital pharmaceu-
ticals over the longer term.
The two main difﬁculties in undertaking the study
were the lack of access to pre-strategy prices because of
conﬁdentiality agreements, and the lack of national
ﬁgures on hospital pharmaceutical expenditure. These
were overcome with the help of the hospital pharma-
cists in calculating the projected savings and providing
annual pharmaceutical expenditure data. In examin-
ing the impact of both price decreases and increases
among that group of medicines, the Top 150 analysis
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
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Figure 3 Percentage growth in total hospital
pharmaceutical expenditure, 29 hospitals
(THPE29).
Table 4 Comparison of inpatient and total hospital pharmaceutical expenditure for 29 major hospitals (IPE29,THPE29) and community
pharmaceutical expenditure, New Zealand, 2000/1 to 2005/6
Financial year*
IPE29 THPE29
Community Pharmaceutical
Expenditure
(NZ$m) % Growth (NZ$m) % Growth (NZ$m) % Growth
2000/1 98.18 — 109.83 — 514.77 -0.2
2001/2 104.88 6.8 116.64 6.2 503.35 -2.2
2002/3 115.64 10.3 126.56 8.5 509.19 1.2
2003/4 120.12 3.9 136.75 8.1 534.81 5.0
2004/5 135.16 12.5 155.77 13.9 565.22 5.7
2005/6 149.62 10.7 173.71 11.5 564.39 -0.1
Mean annual percentage growth 8.8 9.7 1.9
*New Zealand ﬁnancial year runs from July 1 of one year through June 30 of the next year.
[The headings for Table 4 have been changed after online publication 16-May-2008].
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differed from previous studies that examined only the
impact of price decreases on the items subject to new
contracts [18,33].
Themain limitation to this studywas that a random-
ized controlled trial could not be undertaken because
the PM intervention was applied simultaneously to all
hospitals. Therefore, the effects of price changes were
examined using a pre-post design; hospital pharmaceu-
tical expenditure data were collected annually; and a
survey of opinions was undertaken to examine the
effects on availability. A further limitation was the use
of processed rather than raw data in the Top 150
analysis. Hence, accuracy checks were used tominimize
error (recalculations were requested for “outliers” or
wrongly noted contract prices). In addition, sensitivity
analyses were undertaken for both the Top 150 and
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
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Inpatient Pharmaceutical Expenditure (IPE) 
Total Hospital Pharmaceutical Expenditure (THPE) 
Community Pharmaceutical Expenditure (CPE) 
Figure 4 Percentage growth of inpatient and
total hospital pharmaceutical expenditure for 29
major hospitals (IPE29,THPE29) and CPE, New
Zealand, 2000/1 to 2005/6.
-5.0%
0.0%
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10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
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New Zealand 
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Figure 5 Percentage growth in total hospital
pharmaceutical expenditure in ﬁve countries,
2001 to 2005.
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HPE analyses to account for uncertainty when sub-
group results were extrapolated. The availability
surveys had some possible sources of bias. Potential
respondents were closely followed up to maximize
response rates and reduce bias from missing responses.
Nevertheless, bias from inaccurate recall or positive or
negative views about PHARMAC could have been
incorporated because they are difﬁcult to eliminate. A
further limitation was the short time frame of the study
(4 years). A longer study may have captured more
changes. The generalizability of the study could be
limited. PM may be more (or less) acceptable in differ-
ent countries or settings. The restricted choices with
pooled procurement may be less acceptable where pre-
scribers have traditionally had more freedom of choice
(e.g., Europe) or may be difﬁcult to organize where
there are inconsistent funding streams, shortages of
trained staff, or political unrest (the developing world).
Although the PM part of the National Hospital
Pharmaceutical Strategy appeared to be successful,
further studies should be undertaken to examine
whether the low prices are maintained in the longer
term and whether “availability” issues increase or
decrease.
Conclusion
PM, part of PHARMAC’s National Hospital Pharma-
ceutical Strategy launched in 2002 to manage hospital
pharmaceutical expenditure in NZ, was moderately
successful. Savings of NZ$8m to NZ$13m (6–8%) per
annum were made, and growth in IPE appeared to
slow for the year after the launch of the strategy for
all types of hospitals, and for some hospitals in subse-
quent years. Hospital pharmaceutical expenditure
appeared to have risen more steeply during the period
than CPE. Hospital pharmaceutical expenditure in
NZ (and Norway) appeared to grow more slowly than
in the UK and Sweden. Some availability problems
occurred with items on new contracts under the strat-
egy such as out-of-stocks and products perceived by
respondents as inferior. Problems were usually
resolved in weeks, but some took more than a year.
Further research is needed to ensure that favorable
economic effects can be sustained from PM while
keeping unfavorable effects on the availability of medi-
cines to a minimum. Similar centralized approaches to
managing pharmaceutical expenditure may be worth
considering in other countries or regions.
The authors thank the chief pharmacists at NZ’s public hos-
pitals for providing data and completing the questionnaires;
the community pharmacists that supplied some missing data
related to one hospital; PHARMAC for providing data on
additional savings/costs; and the Ministry of Health for pro-
viding information on bed numbers and helping classify the
hospitals. There are no conﬂicts of interest to declare.Ta
bl
e
5
To
ta
lh
os
pi
ta
lp
ha
rm
ac
eu
tic
al
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
20
01
–2
00
5
in
ﬁv
e
co
un
tr
ie
s*
†
N
ew
Z
ea
la
nd
U
K
[9
]
C
an
ad
a
[3
4]
Sw
ed
en
[3
5]
N
or
w
ay
[3
6]
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
(N
Z
$m
)
%
G
ro
w
th
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
(£
m
)
%
G
ro
w
th
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
(C
A
$m
)
%
G
ro
w
th
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
(M
SE
K
)
%
G
ro
w
th
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
(N
O
K
m
)
%
G
ro
w
th
20
01
10
9.
8
6.
2
16
77
11
.1
12
04
.8
8.
0
23
25
8.
0
13
76
-1
.4
20
02
11
6.
6
8.
5
18
76
11
.8
13
37
.2
11
.0
25
47
9.
5
15
15
10
.1
20
03
12
6.
6
8.
1
21
86
16
.5
14
94
.2
11
.7
28
70
12
.7
16
24
7.
2
20
04
13
6.
7
13
.9
25
48
16
.5
34
32
19
.6
18
39
13
.2
20
05
15
5.
8
11
.5
40
33
17
.5
M
ea
n
an
nu
al
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
gr
ow
th
9.
6
14
.0
10
.2
12
.5
7.
3
*F
in
an
ci
al
ye
ar
co
m
m
en
ce
s
Ju
ly
1
in
N
ew
Z
ea
la
nd
;c
om
m
en
ce
s
Ja
nu
ar
y
1
in
ot
he
r
co
un
tr
ie
s.
† N
o
ﬁg
ur
es
av
ai
la
bl
e
fo
r
20
05
fo
r
th
e
U
K
,C
an
ad
a,
Sw
ed
en
,a
nd
N
or
w
ay
,o
r
fo
r
20
04
fo
r
C
an
ad
a.
1224 Tordoff et al.
Source of ﬁnancial support: None.
References
1 Jacobzone S. Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Coun-
tries: Reconciling Social and Industrial Goals. Paris:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, 2000.
2 Gerdtham UG, Lundin D. Why did drug spending
increase during the 1990s? A decomposition based
on Swedish data. Pharmacoeconomics 2004;22:29–
42.
3 Meyer BR. Biotechnology and therapeutics; expensive
treatments and limited resources. A view from the
hospital. Clin Pharmacol Ther 1992;51:359–65.
4 O’Neill C, Hughes CM, Jamison J, et al. Cost of
pharmacological care of the elderly. Implications for
healthcare resources. Drugs Aging 2003;20:253–
61.
5 Ess SM, Schneeweiss S, Szucs TD. European health-
care policies for controlling drug expenditure. Phar-
macoeconomics 2003;21:89–103.
6 DeStaﬁno K. Supply and demand: negotiating the pre-
scription drug labyrinth to reduce costs. Beneﬁts Q
2003;19:30–7.
7 Pillans PI. Control of high cost medicines. N Z Med J
1994;107:5–6.
8 Pharmaceutical Management Agency. Statement of
intent. 2003. Available from: http://www.pharmac.
govt.nz/pdf/SOI2004/pdf [Accessed February 23,
2004].
9 Ofﬁce of Health Economics (OHE). Estimated total
NHS expenditure on pharmaceuticals at manufactur-
ers’ prices, UK, 1969–2004. In: Youen P, ed. Com-
pendium of Health Statistics (17th ed.). London:
OHE, 2005.
10 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Chapter 5;
Health resources. In: Magnus P, ed. Australia’s Health
2004, No. 9. Canberra: AIHW, 2004.
11 Hoffman JM, Shah ND, Vermeulen LC, et al. Project-
ing future drug expenditures—2005. Am J Health Syst
Pharm 2005;62:149–67.
12 NHS Purchasing, Supply Agency. A strategic frame-
work to source pharmaceuticals for the NHS in
England. October 2005. Available from: http://
www.pasa.doh.gov.uk/Pharma/ [Acessed October 7,
2006].
13 Glenngard AH, Hjalte F, Svensson M, et al. Health
Systems in Transition: Sweden. Copenhagen: WHO
Regional Ofﬁce for Europe on behalf of the European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2005.
14 New South Wales Health. Health procurement
website. 2006. Available from: http://www.hp.health.
nsw.gov.au/index.htm [Accessed October 16, 2006].
15 Paris V, Docteur E. Pharmaceutical Pricing and
Reimbursement Policies in Canada. OECD Health
Working Paper (2006)4. Paris: Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co–operation and Development, 2006.
16 Sales MM, Cunningham FE, Glassman PA, et al. Phar-
macy beneﬁts management in the Veterans Health
Administration: 1995–2003. Am J Manag Care
2005;11:104–12.
17 Norris P. The impact of European harmonisation on
Norwegian drug policy. Health Policy 1998;43:65–
81.
18 Campbell KG. The combined hospital boards’ drug
purchasing scheme. N Z Hosp 1980;32:23–7.
19 Davis P. “Tough but fair”? The active management of
the New Zealand drug beneﬁts scheme by an indepen-
dent Crown agency. Aust Health Rev 2004;28:171–
81.
20 Brae R, McNee W, Moore D. Managing phar-
maceutical expenditure while increasing access. The
pharmaceutical management agency (PHARMAC)
experience. Pharmacoeconomics 1999;16:649–60.
21 Pharmaceutical Management Agency. National hos-
pital pharmaceutical strategy ﬁnal version. Welling-
ton: PHARMAC, 2002.
22 Tordoff JM, Norris PT, Kennedy JM, et al. Inﬂuence
of the national hospital pharmaceutical strategy on
the assessment of new medicines in New Zealand
Public Hospitals. J Pharm Pract Res 2005;35:271–5.
23 Tordoff JM, Norris PT, Reith DM. Managing prices
for hospital pharmaceuticals: a successful strategy for
New Zealand? Value Health 2005;8:201–8.
24 Tordoff J, Norris P, Kennedy J, et al. The inﬂuence
of PHARMAC’s National Hospital Pharmaceutical
Strategy on quality use of medicines activities in New
Zealand hospitals. N Z Med J 2006;119:U2100.
25 Tordoff JM, Murphy JE, Norris PT, et al. Use of cen-
trally developed pharmacoeconomic assessments for
local formulary decisions. Am J Health Syst Pharm
2006;63:1613–8.
26 New Zealand Health. Information Service, Public
Hospital Data from National Minimum Data Set,
WIESv8, 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2005. Wellington:
Ministry of Health, 2004.
27 WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Meth-
odology. Anatomic Therapeutic Category (ATC)
Index. 2005. Available from: http://www.whocc.no/
atcddd/ [Accessed June 20, 2005].
28 New Zealand Ministry of Health. Towards a New
Zealand medicines strategy consultation document.
2006. Available from: http://www.moh.govt.nz/
moh.nsf/pagesmh/5633/$File/towards-newzealand-
medicines-strategy-consult.pdf [Accessed December
19, 2007].
29 Pharmaceutical Management Agency. Actual and
Forecast Expenditure with PHARMAC Intervention.
Wellington: PHARMAC, 2006.
30 Norwegian Pharmaceutical Purchasing Collaboration
(Legemiddelinnkjøpssamarbeid (LIS). Website. 2006.
Available from: http://www.lisnorway.no/sider/
tekst.asp?id=english [Accessed November 23, 2006].
31 Curtis S, Mounsey C. Pharmacy procurement: the
contracting process for generic drugs. Hosp Pharm
1998;5:151–4.
32 Gannon K, Gebhart F. Pharmacy debates pluses,
minuses of large GPOs. Hosp Pharm Rep 1997;11:
67–70.
33 Huff-Rousselle M, Burnett F. Cost containment
through pharmaceutical procurement: a Carribean
case study. Int J Health Plann Manage 1996;11:135–
57.
Price Management 1225
34 Canadian Institute for Health Information. Hospital
trends in Canada. 2006. Available from: http://
secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/products/Hospital_Trends_in_
Canada_e.pdf [Accessed November 24, 2006].
35 Statistik at Apoteket. Pharmaceutical Expenditure
Database. Stockholme: Apotek AB, 2006.
36 Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers (LMI). Facts and ﬁgures, 2006. Chapter 2. 08.
Pricing and ﬁnancing. Expenditure on medicines in
the private and public sector. 2006. Available from:
http://www.lmi.no/tf/2006/ﬁles/english/chapt2/
eng208.html [Accessed November 24, 2006].
1226 Tordoff et al.
